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admi-nistrative unit; below the aimag is the soum (= 
district), which is divided into bag (= sub-district). In 
the capital city districts are called duureg and sub-
districts khoroo.
Dzud is the collective term for a range of winter weath-
er-related conditions that prevent domestic animals 
from foraging in open grazing. Dzud is a fact of life for 
Mongolian herders, who have developed strategies for 
coping with and adapting to their harsh environment. 
Heavy accumulations of snow or ice crusts covering 
pastures are the most common form of dzud (white 
dzud). In situations where this precipitation is the 
primary source of drinking water for livestock, the 
absence of snow or ice at winter pastures is also a 
type of dzud (black dzud). Since forage production 
on natural pastures is almost entirely dependent on 
rainfall during the short summer growing period, 
dzud conditions are exacerbated by drought in the 
preceding summer, so that there is less forage available 
for over-wintering animals. Historically, major dzud 
have occurred roughly every seven years, but more 
experienced herders are not surprised when they occur 
in consecutive years as has happened recently.
Ninja is the nickname given to most small-scale 
miners engaged in placer gold mining; their use of a 
green plastic bowl for panning, carried strapped to 
their back, triggered the nickname “ninja” by analogy 
with the ninja turtles television series. (Grayson and 
Murray, 2003).
Ger simply means home in Mongolian. Gers are 
traditional dwellings, well adapted to the nomadic 
life of Mongolia’s herders, and consist of a wooden 
framework and a felt cover. The wooden framework 
includes the walls, long poles, a round smoke escape 
and its supports. Inside the ger, felt is laid either on a 
wooden floor or straight on the ground. The number 
of walls and poles determines the size of the ger. Most 
herders’ gers have five walls, which make a living area 
of 16-18 sqm2. Each ger has a hearth, which is of great 
symbolic and functional importance. In the winter 
the hearth heats the ger and also serves as a stove for 
cooking. Gers weigh approximately 224 kg. It takes 
about half an hour to collapse an average ger and 
slightly longer to rebuild it (World Bank, 2004). 

–  –
Executive Summary
Background
The mining sector is a major contributor to the Mongo-
lian economy, accounting for about 17 percent of GDP, 
65 percent of industrial value added, and 58 percent of 
export earnings. The formal mining sector employs over 
12,000 people and the informal (artisanal) mining 
sector involves many times this number. Over the 
past five years, there has been a rapid rise in mineral 
exploration, mostly due to the 1997 Minerals Law, 
the abolition of a 10 percent gold tax, and the widely 
publicized discovery of the Oyu Tolgoi copper/gold 
deposit in 2001.
The mining industry’s output is largely based on cop-
per and gold. Mongolia has only one copper mine 
(Erdenet), which earns about half of all foreign 
exchange and provides almost 25 percent of govern-
ment revenues. Gold production comes mainly from 
placer operations (shallow alluvial concentrations of 
gold). 
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is not a 
longstanding traditional activity in Mongolia. Yet it 
escalated from insignificance to being the main liveli-
hood for tens of thousands of people (estimates range 
between 30,000 and 100,000 participants) during 
difficult economic times, and became a social safety 
net for herders who lost their herds in natural disasters 
(dzuds). Commercial miners and local government 
authorities have been critical of these operations, 
stressing their environmental health hazards and 
the fact that they operate largely outside the existing 
legal framework for mining. In 2001 and 2002, the 
government attempted to accommodate ASM by 
enacting interim regulations for this informal activity. 
Those regulations proved largely ineffective and were 
not renewed. The government then decided to create 
a legal framework for ASM and drafted an Artisanal 
Mining Law, which failed to gain parliamentary 
approval, and was abandoned in August 2005. A 
completely new Artisanal Mining Law is currently 
being drafted. 
Environmental Impacts 
The environmental record of the Mongolia mining sector 
is mixed at best. Many ongoing operations are managed 
in a sub-optimal way leading to significant environmen-
tal damage and production losses. In addition, despite 
the fact that the sector’s financial contribution to 
the economy is substantial, little has been done to 
systematically assess and address the costs of possible 
environmental damage from the sector’s ongoing and 
planned activities. This is mostly due to a paucity of 
available data and to uncertainty about the long-term 
impacts of mining activities. The following summary 
offers a brief review of the key environmental impacts 
of mining in Mongolia. 
Changes in Hydrological Regimes. Changes in 
hydrological regimes remain a significant problem, 
particularly for placer gold. On balance, current min-
ing practices are inefficient and use excessive process 
water, thus overtaxing surface waters and underground 
Mongolia
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supplies, and also generate excessive effluent, which is 
difficult to manage and poses a threat of uncontrolled 
discharges of slurry. In addition, where rivers are 
illegally dredged and where tailings are discharged 
into surface waters, turbidity of surface waters is a 
major concern. The water pumped from mines of all 
types and discharged into open surface water bodies 
may also cause flooding, leading to the formation of 
new, transient wetlands, which generally fall dry once 
the mine ceases to operate. If adequately managed, 
these wetlands may serve as water treatment plants 
dedicated to polishing seepage water from waste rock 
piles or mine water. 
Deterioration of Water Quality. Increasing ASM activi-
ties are impacting water quality in several rivers across 
the country. An increased risk exists of water-related 
infectious diseases due to unsanitary conditions of 
thousands of artisanal miners living by the rivers and 
streams, as well as toxic poisoning from gross pollution 
of surface and underground water by the uncontrolled 
burning of dung and rubber tires in order to melt the 
permafrost.
Waste-Rock Piles and Tailing Repositories. Waste-rock 
piles and tailing repositories are a significant concern 
at large- to medium-scale mining operations. In 
Mongolia, most waste-rock piles from industrial 
mining are unstable and prone to erosion. Rainfall 
washes gravel and soil down into valleys, where 
valuable grazing land can become polluted. In some 
cases, waste-rock piles and tailings are reworked by 
private miners under unsafe conditions and risk injury 
or loss of life. In the case of Erdenet, the huge TMF is 
an inherent environmental risk. When current plans 
are completed, the TMF will contain over 1 billion 
metric tons of tailings material, thus making it one of 
the largest TMFs existing today. The dyke needs to be 
monitored for seepage and stability; however, limited 
human and financial resources could be a serious 
constraint for the continuation of this activity. In addi-
tion, acid mine drainage (AMD) is becoming a growing 
concern in relation to TMF, particularly in Erdenet. 
There are ongoing discussions regarding the possibility 
of limiting the generation of AMD to controllable 
areas by directing the waste rocks to different dumps 
as a function of their acid-generating potential. Yet the 
timeline for these plans to become operational remains 
unclear.
Mercury Pollution. Mercury pollution is a mounting 
problem. Mercury was banned from gold mines in 
the former Soviet Union in 1982 and today is used 
illegally in only a few placer and hard-rock mines 
in Mongolia. However, illegal mercury usage is 
ubiquitous amongst artisanal hard-rock gold miners 
in Mongolia and has begun to spread to artisanal 
placer gold miners. The advantages of using mercury 
can often be eliminated by proper use of low-cost 
gravitational methods.
Air Pollution. Lower air quality from ASM is posing 
a growing health threat. Dust generated by placer 
ASM—by shoveling, scraping, chiseling, bagging, 
and spillages in a confined space with poor ventila-
tion—causes eye injuries, bronchial complaints, and 
silicosis. Even more dangerous is the smoke from fires 
to melt permafrost, particularly black smoke from 
tires, which contains carbon particles, carbon monox-
ide, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, benzene, phenol, and 
cyanide.
Mining Exploration in Protected Areas. Issues related 
to the possibility of some protected areas being 
declassified for mining purposes remain unresolved. 
The Ministry of Nature and Environment has twice 
considered the declassification of several protected 
areas, partially on request of MRPAM of the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade. Yet no regulations or legal 
procedures currently exist to adequately govern and 
time the declassification procedure. 
The Regulatory and Institutional 
Framework
In the past decade, the Government of Mongolia has 
evolved from being predominantly the owner and 
operator of mines to being a manager and regulator. 
This transformation required setting in place a legal 
framework adequate to guarantee an environmentally 
sustainable growth of the sector. The cornerstones of this 
framework are the laws on environmental protection 
and environmental impact assessment. These laws in-
clude the application of the polluter-pays principle and 
the right of access to environmental information. They 
also address the promotional roles of governmental, 
nongovernmental, and international entities in raising 
environmental awareness through environmental 
education and technical training programs. Yet these 
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laws contain no provisions for a socioeconomic impact 
assessment. The 1997 Mineral Law was designed to 
accommodate the government’s limited institutional 
and financial capacity. While it provides a simple 
framework that takes into account some of the key 
environmental and social impacts of mining, it fails to 
formalize public involvement in the permitting process 
and lacks provisions to ensure sufficient funding for 
ongoing and future rehabilitation. 
The government is committed to strengthening the 
stability of the mining institutional setting and improving 
the overall performance of the sector. It is working on 
updating policy guidelines outlining mineral develop-
ment and sector promotional goals for 2000–10. It has 
established a mandated autonomous lead agency—the 
Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of 
Mongolia (MRPAM)—to facilitate the implementa-
tion of the new mineral law. In spite of these efforts, 
the overall institutional framework remains weak due 
to (a) lack of an appropriate structure to ensure the 
timely enforcement of rules and procedures for local 
government and land user permissions/contracts, 
governors’ approval of environmental submissions, and 
notifications and enforcement of sanctions for license 
violations; (b) poor coordination among the Ministries 
of Nature and Environment, Finance, the State Profes-
sional Supervision Agency, and local administrative 
bodies; and (c) weak and/or nonexistent compensation 
schemes for land acquisition due to mining expansion 
and social programs to benefit communities living 
near mining areas
Social Issues
Mining companies should be a valuable component of 
a diversified livelihood economy. Yet, because small 
industrial cities built to serve the needs of large mining 
enterprises were set up as new urban centers with 
no appreciable local rural recruitment, rural people 
tend to see mining activities as being destructive of 
nature, and contributing little to the local economy. 
This perception is reinforced by the fact that the 
current regulatory and institutional framework does 
not particularly safeguard communities living near 
mining development areas. Development programs 
are undertaken as “add-on” measures by the mining 
company, with the view to establishing a positive 
relationship with the local communities. Socioeco-
nomic expenditure by the mining companies remains 
minimal. As a result, important social topics that are 
largely unresolved include the complex issues of land 
use, financial contributions to the local community, 
and the role of informal mining. 
Finally, public awareness of the costs and benefits of 
different types of mining and processing techniques is 
low. The public and the media are often unaware or 
misinformed about the potential environmental im-
pacts of mining—whether it is heavily sophisticated, 
large-scale mining, or “pick-and-shovel” artisanal 
mining. In a limited way, the government is working 
to ensure that stakeholders are informed with respect 
to both the positive and negative consequences of new 
mining developments, as well as empowered to be part 
of the decision-making process.
Priorities for the Short-term 
Based on the field observations and a review of 
background materials, the following short–term 
priorities should be addressed to improve the existing 
record of the mining sector environmental and social 
practices.
Support and facilitate the introduction of Best Avail-
able Techniques into placer gold mining to address 
the considerable environmental impacts and 
damage to livelihoods of rural people that ensue. 
For land-based placer gold mining, the following 
goals of BAT are now achievable in Mongolia: 
gold recovery mostly by gravitational methods, 
retorts and closed ovens vented to the outside of 
dwelling/work areas; rear-casting of all materials; 
minimum mining footprint; creation of final 
contours, complete with topsoil cover, the same 
day as the material was excavated; no double-
handling of materials and no “temporary” waste 
mounds; minimum abstraction of process water 
from surface or underground sources; recycling of 
semi-cleaned effluent as process water; and zero 
discharge of effluent. 
Enable full public participation in decision-making 
process pertaining to the development of mining 
operations, including allowing access to and 
discussion of relevant environmental information 
and documents.
•
•
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Improve employment opportunities for local people 
in mining. At the national level, ensure that more 
employees are Mongolian citizens, especially in 
long-established mining operations. Of these, a 
small number should be reserved for residents of 
the area in which the mining operation is based.
Address the fate of mine-dependent communities. 
Local governments should be encouraged to 
•
•
diversify into alternate industries in order to 
prevent social upheaval in the event of mine 
closure. Where no alternatives can be found, 
government could become involved jointly with 
the mining company to forecast and mitigate the 
socioeconomic effects of eventual mine closure.
–  –
Introduction
This report is based mainly on extensive field work undertaken in 2003, as well as follow-up research carried out between July and September 2005. It complements the 
recently completed study entitled “Mongolia Mining 
Sector: Managing the Future” (Husband et al, 2004), 
which did not specifically deal with issues related to 
the environmental and social impacts of mining. 
The main objectives of this work include: (a) presenting 
an overview of the current environmental and social 
practices of the mining sector in Mongolia, including 
artisanal mining; (b) reviewing the current environmen-
tal, social, regulatory, and institutional frameworks of 
the mining sector, as well as identifying their strengths 
and weaknesses and suggesting options for improvement; 
and (c) proposing short-term strategic priorities for a 
more efficient, environmentally friendly use of mining 
resources.
The report is divided into four sections. The first 
section is a short introduction to the mining sector in 
Mongolia. The second section provides an overview 
of key environmental and social issues in the mining 
sector. The third outlines the key strengths and 
weaknesses of regulatory and institutional frameworks 
to address eventual environmental and social issues 
in mining. The fourth section identifies short-term 
priorities to improve the existing record of the mining 
sector’s environmental and social practices.
The data and information contained in this report 
comes from central and local government agencies, 
international development agencies, local research 
institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. The 
findings of this report were informally shared with key 
counterparts—within and outside the Government 
of Mongolia—at the national and local level during 
the two phases of the field work. The results of those 
informal consultations have also been incorporated 
into this report.
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Mongolia’s mining sector is a major contributor to the economy, account-ing for about 17 percent of GDP, 65 percent of industrial value added, and 
58 percent of export earnings. Major export-related 
minerals include copper, molybdenum, gold, coal, 
and fluorspar concentrates. Copper mining alone 
earns some 25 percent of all foreign exchange, and 
provides almost one-quarter of government revenues. 
In addition, Mongolia in 2004 rose to the third largest 
producer of fluorspar worldwide. The formal mining 
industry sector employs over 12,000 people, and the 
1. The Mining Sector—A Brief Overview
informal (artisanal) mining sector involves many times 
this number. Prior to 1992 and the shift to a market 
economy, the mining industry was dominated by state-
owned, Mongolian-Soviet joint ventures with Russia, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hun-
gary. These ventures focused mostly on coal, fluorspar, 
gold, tin, copper, and molybdenum. Since 1992, the 
number of local Mongolian companies—sometimes 
partnering with Canadian, British, Australian, Rus-
sian, and Chinese companies—involved in exploration 
and mining has increased. 
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Figure 1. Mining Contribution to Gross Industrial Output
Source: Husband, Charles, and Vera Songwe. 2004. “Mongolia Mining Sector: Managing the Future”. Country 
Economic Memorandum on the Sources of Growth in Mongolia. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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The past focus of government-led work was on 
discovering and categorizing all mineral deposits and 
occurrences regardless of their type, size, or viability. 
More recently, private investors, responding to an 
improved investment climate, have concentrated al-
most exclusively on six high-value export metals: gold, 
copper, zinc and uranium, plus fluorspar and coal. 
Gold production mainly comes from placer operations, 
but output is stagnating as large readily accessible rich 
deposits are depleted. Exploration by an estimated 
200-plus placer drilling rigs is now compensating for 
the decline with new discoveries. 
Unlike many other developing countries, ASM is not 
part of traditional subsistence economy in Mongolia. 
The initiation of ASM and its dramatic growth over 
the past decade, particularly in terms of organizational 
structure, is a manifestation of poverty-driven self-help 
efforts to counter some of the more pernicious effects 
of the transition to a market economy, including job 
loss, declining real incomes, decline in rural services, 
and lack of a social safety net particularly in the face of 
natural disasters (dzuds). 
There is a wide range of opinions about the number 
of artisanal and small-scale miners in Mongolia, 
stemming from the large size of the country, the lack 
of a full survey, the practical difficulties of counting 
ASM at any given site, and the substantial seasonal 
fluctuations in numbers and geographical distribution. 
According to government estimates, there are about 
30,000 informal gold miners, but an independent sur-
vey suggests there are at least 100,000. Regarding coal, 
the general consensus is that about 1,100 artisanal and 
small-scale operations are active in coal mining in the 
winter, virtually all in Nalaikh. For fluorspar, there 
is consensus that several thousand ASM operations 
have become active in fluorspar mining and processing 
in the last four years. In addition, there are perhaps 
no more than about 1,000 informal miners engaged 
in mining of materials serving local needs, such as 
salt, clay, and sand.  Possibly another 500 informal 
miners are engaged in illegal mining and export of 
fossils, semi-precious stones, meteorites, and mineral 
specimens. 
Figure 2.  Major Operating Mines and Mineral Deposits in Mongolia
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun 
Engineering Background Papers. Cologne.
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Figure 3.  Estimated Informal Gold Miners in principal Aimags 
Source: Husband, Charles, and Vera Songwe. 2004. “Mongolia Mining Sector: Managing the Future”. Country Economic Memorandum on the 
Sources of Growth in Mongolia. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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2. Environmental and Social Impacts 
Environmental Impacts
To date, the environmental record of the Mongolia mining sector is mixed at best. Many of the ongoing operations, including large-scale mining, and especially in 
domestically owned mines, are managed in a sub-op-
timal way, leading to production losses and significant 
environmental damage. In addition, despite the fact 
that the sector’s financial contribution to the economy 
is substantial, very minimal effort has been made to 
assess and address the costs of possible environmental 
damage deriving from the sector’s activities (Rhein-
braun Engineering und Wasser GMBH, 2003). This 
is mostly due to limited data, uncertainty about the 
long-term impacts of mining activities, and general 
lack of awareness of the fact that many of these nega-
tive impacts could be rectified for minimal cost and/or 
through better production methods. The following 
discussion provide an overview of key environmental 
issues in some of the key mining areas in Mongolia.
The Erdenet Copper Deposit
The Erdenetyn-Ovoo copper ore deposit is located 
close to the town of Erdenet in the Bulgan province, 
approximately 250 kilometers northwest of Ulaan-
baatar. The deposit was discovered and explored 
between 1960 and 1972. In 1973, the Government 
of Mongolia—together with the former Soviet 
Union—set up the Erdenet Mining Corporation.
Waste Rock and Tailings Repositories. Truck and 
shovel open-pit mining are the most common mining 
methods at Erdenet. Production capacity is 24 million 
tons of ore per year. Each year, 10 to 12 million tons 
of subgrade ore are added to the existing stockpile. 
The waste from ore processing is pumped to a TMF, 
which is located approximately 4 km away from the 
plant. The TMF is basically a 5 km-long dyke of 
standard design, of which 3 km are covered with water 
and 2 km are exposed tailing beaches. It contains 400 
million tons of mine tailings, as well as 15 million m³ 
of supernatant water. To make room for more tailings, 
the dyke is periodically increased in lifts of 6 to 10 
meters; current plans call for the dyke to reach its final 
height in 2010, by which time two more lifts will have 
been placed. There is a critical need to strengthen the 
routine maintenance and monitoring of the dyke’s 
stability according to international standards to avoid 
and/or manage any seepage contamination problems 
resulting from the tailings turning acidic, as the ore 
contains copper-sulfide minerals and pyrite, which 
cannot entirely be removed in the beneficiation 
process. To date, only some $30,000 is being spent to 
put topsoil on the tailings. Since a possible date for 
the decommissioning of the operation is still to be set, 
there is no plan for environmental remediation after 
the mining operations cease, nor have funds been set 
aside from operating income for this purpose.
Blowing tailing dust is also one of the most serious 
environmental issues. With an open area of ap-
proximately 500 hectares of dry tailing beaches and a 
very fine-grained tailing material (80 percent < 0.74 
µm), the wind has no trouble picking up dust. There 
is not much that can be done to mitigate the problem; 
Mongolia
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stabilizing the surface with surfactants would probably 
help, but it is considered too costly since it has to be 
done on a regular basis due to new waste material 
continuously being pumped into the TMF. 
Changes in Hydrological Regimes. In spite of the fact 
that 95 percent of process water used in the beneficia-
tion plant is being recycled from the TMF, freshwater 
consumption and waste from mining operations 
represent a concern, particularly considering the 
semi-arid climate of the region. Some 800 m³/h of 
freshwater are needed in the process for concentrate 
washing. This water is pumped from the Selenge 
River, 64 km north of Erdenet, which is also the major 
source of drinking water for the town of Erdenet. 
The Zaamar Gold Mining District
The Zaamar gold mining district is located some 180 
km northwest of Ulaanbaatar in the Tov aimag, along 
the banks of the Tuul River. Gold is present as primary 
ore and placer. The mining of primary ore started in 
1998 at the Bumbat mine; following joint-venture 
problems, the operation ceased and the equipment was 
abandoned. Recently, the mill has been redesigned and 
refurbished by Mongolyn Alt Corporation with the 
assistance of a Chinese company (Dallas, 1999). 
Changes in Hydrological Regimes. Most of the smaller 
industrial mines are open-cast operations using free 
digging shovels or hydraulic excavators and haul trucks 
that dump the ore near the wash plants. Oversize 
material remains on the screen and is blasted out via a 
tailgate by high pressure water from the water cannon. 
To provide process water for the placer wash plants, 
water is pumped from the Tuul River. No chemicals 
are added, gravitation methods being sufficient to 
recover the gold. The resulting effluent is directed to 
tailings ponds to settle out the coarsest material down 
to fine sand, and the still-turbid water is then recycled 
back to the wash plant or illegally discharged to the 
Tuul River. Water cannons consume large amounts of 
water, and the pumps are often left running even when 
the wash plant is idle. The settling ponds are unusually 
large and accordingly vulnerable to uncontrolled 
discharge by overtopping of the earth dam or its 
collapse. At least two mines discharge all effluent 
directly onto the floodplain, with frequent discharge 
of dirty water into the Tuul River. Overall, water use is 
very inefficient and is taxing surface water supplies and 
generating excessive volume of effluent that is more 
and more difficult to manage.
Waste Rock and Tailing Repositories. The long-term 
stability of the tailings dams in the Zaamar area is a 
concern, since the settled deposits are fine grained, 
particularly in the second and third settling ponds. 
As a result, the material does not drain quickly but 
remains behind as slimes with low shear strength; 
this poses a dangerous area for people and animals. 
Figure 4. Waste Rock Piles, Tailing Discharges, and Dry 
Tailing Beaches in Erdenet
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the 
Environmental and Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” 
Rheinbraun Engineering Background Papers. Cologne.
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Waste-rock piles from open pits and reject piles from 
the dredges left behind with their initial natural angle 
of repose may become unstable in the rainy season and 
thus pose a risk to people and grazing animals if not 
properly secured. Unlike north Mongolia, the Zaamar 
goldfield is too arid for forest cover, and the steppe 
is characterized by thin soils prone to wind erosion. 
The steep-sided waste mounds and the extensive bare 
areas are aggravating this problem and contributing to 
desertification.
Until 2003, there was scant evidence of even 
rudimentary reclamation of derelict abandoned mine 
sites at Zaamar. Following considerable local and 
national pressure—and enforcement of environmental 
regulations by the Professional Inspectorate, MRPAM, 
and MNE—rehabilitation is now much in evidence. 
The pressure includes a series of joint regulations by 
the MNE and the Ministry of Agriculture, and a set 
of mandatory Mongolian National Standards (MNS) 
that have full legal force, unlike western voluntary 
ISO, DIN, and BS codes (Nelle and Hoffman, 2001). 
The Mongolian regulations and standards include 
the stripping, storage, and reuse of topsoil; maximum 
permissible angles of final slopes; and a procedure for 
revegetation and aftercare. 
As yet, remedial work is basic and crude, relying on 
earthmoving machinery to lower waste mounds, 
and push down pit faces, and reduce the steepness 
of slopes. In 2004, the Mongolian enterprise Mon-
polymet Ltd became the first Zaamar placer company 
to replace topsoil and attempt proper revegetation, 
albeit importing the soil, as the original topsoil had 
been lost by failure to strip and store it. In 2005, 
both Shijir Alt Ltd and Altan Dornod Mongol Ltd 
embarked on basic recontouring of two of the worst 
derelict mining sites in the Zaamar goldfield, namely 
the south dredge area and the ruined Hailaast Valley. 
Changes in Hydrological Regimes. Along a 50-km 
stretch of floodplain of the Tuul River, large-scale 
placer mining is done by dredging, which seem to be a 
major source of sediment contaminating the river. Silt, 
sand, and gravel are released, particularly when river 
water is diverted into the artificial new water course. 
This release is temporary, because mining is proceed-
ing subsequently into zones that are removed from 
the new river channel. All of the larger commercial 
operations have constructed tailings ponds in order to 
allow the recycling of water for ore processing. This 
reduces the overall discharge of sediment-laden water 
into the Tuul River; however, there is little evidence 
of plans for stabilizing and reclaiming the tailings 
and settling ponds, although in this semi-arid climate 
they tend to dry out to firm ground if shallow. The 
quality of surface water downstream from the open-pit 
mines that do not maintain tailings ponds is affected 
by turbidity caused by uncontrolled discharge of dirty 
effluent. 
Figure 5. Schematic Plan and View of Dredging Sequence at Zaamar
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. 
“Review of the Environmental and Social Policies and 
Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineer-
ing Background Papers. Cologne.
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Gold Mining in the Turgen River Basin 
In the Turgen River area of northeast Mongolia, 
mining started in 1993. The activities are targeting 
colluvial and alluvial gold placers along small tributar-
ies of the Turgen River. Total production is estimated 
to be around 300 kg per year. 
Changes in Hydrological Regimes. Water for washing the 
ore is either pumped from wells, dammed off streams, 
or taken from the open pits. The water is discharged 
with the tailings into ponds, where most of it evapo-
rates. As more water is removed than discharged back 
into the stream and groundwater system, the water 
table in the side valleys has declined and streams have 
dried up.
Waste Rock and Tailing Repositories. Stripped zones 
and corresponding dumps of topsoil, waste rock, 
and tailings were left behind without any mitigation 
after mining was terminated. Presently, there are 
three abandoned sites awaiting rehabilitation; to date, 
however, there are no plans to rehabilitate these areas. 
As a result, the long-term stability of the tailings dams 
in the Turgen River area remains a concern, since 
the settled deposits are fine grained, particularly in 
the second and third settling ponds. As a result, the 
material does not drain quickly but remains behind as 
slimes with low shear strength; this poses a dangerous 
area for people and animals. Waste-rock piles from 
open pits and reject piles from the dredges left behind 
with their initial natural angle of repose may become 
unstable in the rainy season and thus pose a risk to 
people and grazing animals if not properly secured.
The Shariin Gol Coal Deposit
The Shariin Gol coal deposit is located 240 kilometers 
north of Ulaanbaatar and 75 km southeast of Dark-
han. It is an open-pit mine, which began operations 
on an industrial scale in 1965. The mine occupies an 
area of 580 hectares, comprises one open pit and one 
large and several smaller waste-rock piles, and has a 
current production of about 0.8 million t/a. The coal 
is crushed at the plant and shipped via railway to 
Erdenet and Ulaanbaatar. 
Waste Rock and Tailing Repositories. Waste rock is 
produced at a rate of 4.5 million m3 per year. It is 
dumped in the immediate vicinity of the open pit. The 
waste-rock piles contain 210 million m³ of overburden. 
Reclamation has not started yet. The mine plans 
include flattening the waste-rock piles. Revegetation 
is not planned. At the current production rate, the 
estimated remaining lifetime of the mine is 20 years. 
The mine employs 1,000 workers and supports a small 
town in the immediate vicinity. In October 2003, the 
Russian company KRASO purchased 80 percent of 
the state-owned shares in the Shariin Gol Joint Stock 
Company and plans to implement measures aimed at 
reducing the environmental impacts of this mining 
operation. Rehabilitation of the waste rock has been 
under discussion for two years; however, no action has 
been taken yet. According to the mining inspector 
of the Darkhan Aimag, the Shariin Gol mine is run 
without a proper environmental monitoring program, 
despite pertinent legislation that has been in place 
since 2002.
AMD from waste-rock piles may pose a long-term 
risk at Shariin Gol. An overall decommissioning 
plan—showing the final topography after waste-rock 
pile reclamation and restoration of the hydrological 
regime—has yet to be established. Apparently the 
Shariin Gol operating license does not contain 
discharge and effluent limits. Up to 2000, the mine 
has advanced without the need for consultation with 
local authorities. Only since 2000, after the introduc-
tion of new regulations, has the mine been obliged 
to coordinate its activities with the aimag and soum 
authorities.
The Bor Undur Fluorspar Deposit 
The Bor Undur fluorspar mine is located in Khentii 
aimag, approximately 380 km southeast of Ulaan-
baatar. Access is by steppe trails and a spur rail line 
that connects to the Trans-Mongolian railway about 
40 km south of the complex. The area contains a large 
number of fluorspar deposits and occurrences, with 
five ore bodies presently mined. In addition, the Bor 
Undur mill processes ore from the Urgen mine, which 
is located about 450 km southeast of Ulaanbaatar, near 
the Trans-Mongolian railway in Sainshand aimag. 
Waste Rock and Tailing Repositories. The tailings slurry 
is pumped through an insulated pipeline over to a 
settling pond, which sits in a shallow valley, closed 
off by a dam with a length of 1.8 km made of rocks 
and clay-rich soil. Most of the mill tailings have been 
discharged from various spigots that are located along 
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the crown of the dam. Supernatant has accumulated 
over an area of around 0.46 km2, which is a small 
portion of the total tailings area. The present method 
of tailings discharge results in an area of well-drained 
and consolidated tailings near the spigots in a zone of 
slimes around the overflow collector, which is likely 
to remain unconsolidated for some time after the 
processing plant ceases to operate, thus posing hazards 
to the public in the absence of a mine closing plan and 
measures to promote drainage and consolidation. 
The Baganuur Coal Deposit 
The state-owned Baganuur coal mine is located 
approximately 110 km east of Ulaanbaatar in Tov 
aimag. It covers an area of 1,700 hectares, with an 
additional annual disturbance of 25 to 30 ha, and 
supplies 80 percent of the coal used by Ulaanbaatar’s 
power plants. Until the start-up of the Nariin Sukhait 
mine, it represented 60 percent of Mongolia’s coal 
production. Processing of coal consists of crushing 
only; no washing is involved.
Changes in Hydrological Regime. Groundwater is 
removed at a rate of approximately 3.5 million m3 
per year through wells located along the pits in order 
to lower the groundwater table to a level of about 20 
meters below the bottom of the pits. These extend 
presently to an average depth of 70 meters below 
surface. A portion of the water is used for industrial 
purposes at the mine. To date, no hydrogeological 
modeling has been undertaken to address these issues. 
In addition, to facilitate access to the mining area, the 
Khutsaa River  (which was draining through a series of 
surface water bodies into Kherlen River) was diverted 
over a distance of 12 kilometers. The diversion of the 
Khutsaa River has become redundant, however, as the 
river has dried out, possibly also due to the drought 
condition in recent years. Water monitoring started in 
1995, and covers 29 chemical and physical parameters 
that are measured in quarterly intervals at 11 sites. 
Initially, it encompassed 13 sample sites, two of which 
were lost due to drought conditions in recent years. 
Waste Rock and Tailing Repositories. From 1978 to 
2001, approximately 162 million m³ of waste rock 
were removed from the pits. Some 103 million m³ 
were used as backfill in mined-out areas, and 59 
million m³ were deposited outside the pits. As a result 
of the 1995 EIA’s recommendations, in 2000 the 
mine started the rehabilitation of waste-rock piles. 
The rehabilitation of waste-rock piles entails the 
flattening of the slopes from the steep natural angle 
of repose to approximately 1:2 (25°) and revegetation 
by seeding grass. Presently, close to 61 hectares of 
waste-rock area have been contoured and 46 hectares 
have been seeded. In addition, in 2002, a 15-year plan 
for reclamation, which also include revegetation was 
developed. The proposed 
project, however, does not 
include plans for the final 
reclamation and post-de-
commissioning monitoring 
of the mining site. In 2005, 
the government included 
Baganuur in its privatiza-
tion program for 2006-8 for 
discussion by Parliament.
The Aduun Chuluun Coal 
Deposit
The Aduun Chuluun 
coal mine is located 6.5 
km north of the town of 
Choibalsan in Dornod 
aimag. Originally conceived 
as an underground opera-
tion, it was converted into 
Figure 6. Unreclaimed Land in Tolgoit
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and Social Policies and 
Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineering Background Papers. Cologne.
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an open-pit mining operation occupying 
approximately 40 ha in 1969.
Waste Rock and Tailing Repositories. Surface 
disturbance appears to be one of the most 
significant issues. Waste rock is partially 
filled back into the pit or stored in piles. 
Some of the dumps reach 30 meters in 
height and rise above the natural topog-
raphy. Locally, the waste-rock piles show 
signs of erosion; however, stabilization of 
the material takes place by natural plant 
succession on the slopes of the older piles. 
The original environmental assessment 
addresses these issues in a 2002 mine 
reclamation project document. The 
company has started to rehabilitate one of 
the waste-rock piles by spreading topsoil and planting 
trees that appear to be alien for the region. It is unclear 
whether or not the revegetation is successful without 
regular watering and constant protection. In the 
meantime, the underground excavation has collapsed; 
the ground above has subsided and is presently stable. 
The pit is expanded each year, triggering a new 
environmental assessment. Although the law requires 
a deposit of 50 percent of the annual reclamation cost, 
no such payments are made. The company believes its 
revegetation efforts are sufficient. 
Changes in Hydrological Regimes. Groundwater is 
removed at a rate of approximately 3.5 million m3 
per year through wells located along the pits in order 
to lower the groundwater table to a level of about 20 
meters below the bottom of the pits. These extend 
presently to an average depth of 70 meters below 
surface. With mining progressing toward the west, the 
depth of the pits will increase. 
Artisanal and Small-scale (ASM) Gold 
Mining 
Informal ASM gold mining can and often does 
degrade or destroy placer reserves, notably by remov-
ing pay gravel before and during formal placer mining. 
This renders full-scale mining more 
complicated, more risky, and less profitable 
(and sometimes unprofitable). The environ-
mental impacts of ASM are also significant 
and represent a growing concern in 
Mongolia (Grayson and Murray, 2003). 
Air Pollution. Lower air quality from 
ASM is posing a growing health threat. 
Dust generated by placer ASM—from 
shoveling, scraping chiseling, bagging, 
and spillages in a confined space with poor 
ventilation—causes eye injury, bron-
chial complaints, and silicosis. Even more 
dangerous is the smoke from fires to melt 
permafrost, particularly black smoke from 
tires. The sheer volume of smoke is known 
to be exerting a strong negative impact 
on the health of the miners, livestock, 
Figure 7. Tree Planting for Land Reclamation at Aduun Chulun
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and 
Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineering Background 
Papers. Cologne.
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and 
Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineering Background 
Papers. Cologne
Figure 8. Abandoned Mining Equipment at Mardai
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and sensitive vegetation. Finally, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that low air quality in ASM ger settlements 
aggravates respiratory conditions of ASM miners. The 
main fuel of the ger stoves is wood, but some ninjas 
burn low-grade brown coal (if available) and others 
burn dried animal dung (Grayson and Murray, 2003). 
A faint pall of grayish smoke is a feature of ASM 
ger settlements, particularly in the winter. Carbon 
monoxide levels are believed to be significant, but no 
systematic testing has been undertaken. 
Water Pollution. ASM is considered the main cause 
of substantial deterioration in water quality in several 
rivers across the country. An increased risk exists of 
(a) water-related infectious diseases due to unsanitary 
conditions at thousands of placer ASM miners living 
by rivers and streams, and (b) toxic poisoning from 
gross pollution of surface and underground water by 
the uncontrolled burning of wood, dung, and rubber 
tires in order to melt the permafrost. For example, the 
Ongiin River supplies drinking water for more than 
50,000 people and 740,000 livestock. It drains south 
for 435 kilometers and terminates in Ulaan Nuur 
(Red Lake) in Omnogovi Aimag, and has been dry 
in places since 1999. This has caused an ecological 
crash, including extinction of many plant species, 
natural resource depletion, rangeland degradation, and 
increased desertification. Impacts in the Ongiin Valley 
are severe, and led to the emergence of a local NGO, 
the Ongiin River Movement, which is petitioning for 
placer mining to be curbed to limit water abstraction 
and compel rehabilitation of mined land. Thousands 
of placer ninjas are aggravating the situation by using 
fire to melt the permafrost. Local loss of permafrost 
prevents the spring thaw getting to the main river, the 
water now pouring through gaps in the once continu-
ous permafrost seal. 
Mercury Pollution. Pollution from mercury is a 
substantial problem, particularly in the Boroo River 
due to informal mercury panning; the overall resulting 
health impacts are believed to be serious; however, 
to date no systematic testing has been done, and no 
specific measures have been put in place to address 
this problem. Not only is mercury polluting rivers, 
but it is also found in high quantity in the soil. A 
2002 study by JICA documented high mercury levels 
in contaminated soils at the site of the disused Boroo 
gold recovery factory. Mercury-contaminated soil is 
used for grazing by sheep, goats, horses, and cattle, 
and for production of cereals and vegetables. Soil 
mercury pollution represents a new and urgent risk to 
human health, yet little has been done to adequately 
deal with it.
The Mining–Protected Areas Nexus 
Mining typically uses land more extensively than other 
industries. Conflicts of interest are become more and 
more frequent in areas that are protected under the 
regulations of the Mongolian Law on Special Protected 
Areas. 
The Mongolian government has a long-term objective 
of giving statutory protection to 30 percent of the 
country by designating them as protected areas. A 
challenge to this occurred in mid-2002 when MIT, via 
MRPAM, proposed removing protected status from 
1.9 million ha in 18 protected areas, almost 10 percent 
of Mongolia’s protected-area system. In response and 
under pressure, MNE proposed dropping protection 
status from a somewhat smaller area, 434,000 ha in 10 
protected areas. The rationale of the MIT proposal and 
the MNE’s partial acquiescence was aiming at stimu-
lating investments in exploration and mining. Both 
proposals were rejected by Parliament in late 2002. 
A further challenge to selected protected areas arose 
in late 2003, when the government proposed to 
Parliament to remove protected status from an even 
greater area—some 3.1 million ha, about 15 percent of 
the protected-area system—in four protected areas: the 
Small Gobi, Great Gobi Special Protected Area, Mon-
gol Daguur Special Protected Area, and Onon Balj 
National Park. The rationale behind this proposal is 
that illegal mining activities have become widespread 
in these areas; therefore, removing protection to allow 
formal mineral exploration and mining to take place 
would restore legal control and regulation of these 
activities. This proposal was rejected in January 2004 
by the Standing Committees on Economic Protection 
and Environment and Rural Development.
Since January 2004, no further effort has been made 
to change the status of any protected areas, and for the 
moment the government’s effort is devoted to intro-
ducing an effective ASM law and making amendments 
to the Minerals Law to strengthen environmental 
protection. In 2005, some practical recommendations 
Mongolia
18
were made to GoM that could help Mongolia balance 
the existing system of protected areas and the needs of 
mineral exploration. These recommendations included: 
Prohibition of, according to the Mineral Law, of 
issuing new mineral licenses in protected areas 
and areas proposed for protection, and increased 
patrols to prevent unlicensed mineral activities in 
these areas.
Holding mineral exploration and extraction 
activities legally operating within protected areas 
or their buffer zones to higher environmental 
standards than mines operating outside protected 
areas. Costs of intensive monitoring and inspec-
tion of these sites should be paid for by the 
licensed mining entity involved.
Preserving the protected status to all expired 
mineral licenses within existing and proposed 
protected areas.
Promoting land trades for mineral licenses on 
unprotected lands in combination with special 
dispensations, such as tax breaks, as the ideal way 
of eliminating mineral licenses within existing 
and proposed protected areas.
The potential for discovering new mineral deposits 
inside protected areas could be significant. A way 
to measure the probability that a particular mineral 
deposit or occurrence exists in or near protected land 
is the intensity of exploration activity, which can be 
assessed by the density of exploration activities; the 
development pressures these areas varies, and potential 
environmental stress is assessed as low to 
medium. What follows are illustrations of 
typical exploration scenarios in the Small 
Gobi Strictly Protected Area, the Onon-
Balj Sav National Conservation Park, and 
the Khan Khentii Special Protected Area, 
plus the adjoining Gorkhi-Terelj National 
Conservation Park and a smaller SPA, 
nature reserve, and national conservation 
park located south, southeast, and south-
west of Ulaanbaatar. 
The Small Gobi Strictly Protected Area 
(SPA)
The Small Gobi SPA was established in 
1993 and occupies more than 1.8 million 
hectares of land in two discrete areas 
•
•
•
•
(A and B) in the South Gobi aimag and Dornogobi 
aimag. The SPA is the main habitat for the Khulan 
wild ass, black-tailed gazelle, the argali mountain 
sheep, and ibex. Figure 39 illustrates exploration 
licenses in blue and mining licenses in red as of 
September 1, 2002. The exploration licenses are 
encroaching on both areas A and B, with large gaps 
in between. The pressure on the SPA appears to be 
light. However, the development at Oyu Tolgoi may 
add to the stress. As of June 2003, the concession map 
of the Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of 
Mongolia (MRPAM) showed an increase in activity 
along the northwest edge of area A, and the need for 
greater monitoring and enforcement of the licensing 
regulations.
The Onon-Balji Sav National Conservation Park
The Onon-Balji Sav National Conservation Park 
consists of a larger western area (A) in Khentii aimag 
and a smaller eastern part straddling the Khentii-
Dornod aimag boundary. The park covers more than 
400,000 hectares. It encompasses Siberian forest 
taiga and arid steppe environment. Exploration and 
mining licenses are scattered throughout the area. As 
the park is located in an auriferous northeast trending 
structural zone extending to the Baley gold deposit in 
the Russian Federation, exploration may focus on the 
area in the future. The June 2003 concession map of 
the MRPAM shows an increase in activity between 
area A and the border to the Russian Federation.
Figure 9. The Small Gobi SPAs A and B
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and 
Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineering Background 
Papers. Cologne.
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The Khan Khentii Strictly Protected Area (SPA)
The Khan Khentii SPA, with the adjoining Gorkhi-
Terelj National Conservation Park, stretches from just 
northeast of Ulaanbaatar to the Russian border. The 
SPA was placed under special protection 
in 1992 and gained the status of a strictly 
protected area in 1995. The national park 
was also established in 1995. The area is 
located in Tov and Selenge aimags. The 
SPA and the national park cover more than 
1.2 million hectares and almost 300,000 
hectares respectively.
The SPA and the national park encompass 
the Khan Kentii Mountains, which extend 
from arid steppe in the south to conifer-
ous forest taiga in the north. It is the 
headwater region of the Tuul River, which 
flows to Lake Baikal and on into the Arctic 
Ocean, and of the Onon and Kherlen 
Rivers, which drain via the Amur into the 
Pacific Ocean. There is little pressure from 
exploration and mining activities. Conces-
sions are located only along portions of 
the SPA’s eastern boundary. Intensive 
exploration and mining is centered on 
the Zaamar region, which is 50 to 60 kilometers west 
of the protected areas. The Gorkhi-Terelj National 
Conservation Park is one of the most visited protected 
areas in the country. Another SPA is located south of 
the capital city. In 1995, it was 
declared a strictly protected 
area under the name of Bogd 
Uul. It encompasses about 
41,000 hectares of land around 
Bogdkhaan Mountain, a land-
mark of historical and cultural 
heritage. Mining concessions 
are located mostly along its 
northwestern and southeastern 
borders. We expect the city 
population to exert more stress 
on the protected land, since 
the small-scale mining is in its 
vicinity. 
On the basis of the number, 
density, and distance of mining 
concessions near protected ar-
eas, we have classified the stress 
derived from mining activity 
in three categories: “weak,” 
“medium,” and “strong.” Table 
1 lists the protected areas and 
the estimated potential stress 
from mining.
Figure 10. Onon Baljin Sav National Conservation 
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and 
Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineering Background 
Papers. Cologne.
Figure 11. The Khan Khentii SPA and the Gorhki-Terelj National Conservation 
Park
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and Social Policies 
and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineering Background Papers. Cologne.
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Social Impacts 
Formal Mining
Mining companies could be a valuable component of 
a diversified rural livelihood economy. This is arguably 
true of the small industrial cities built to serve the 
Type Name Aimag(s) Size (km2)
Potential
stress from
mining
activities
Great Gobi Gobi Altai/Bayankhongor 53,117 low
Khukh Serkhin Bayan Olgii/Khovo 659 low
Bogd Uul Tov 417 low*
Khasagt Kharkhain Gobi Altai 275 medium
Khan Khentii Tov/Khentii 12,271 low
Nomrog Dornod 3,112 low
Eastern Mongolia Dornod/Sukhbataar 5,704 low
Mongol Daguur Dornod 1,030 low
Otgontenger Zavkhan 955 low
Uvs Lake Basin Uvs 7,125 low
Small Gobi Omnogovi/Dornogovi 18,392 medium
Strictly
protected
area
Khoridol Saridag Khovsgol 1,886 low
Khovsgol Lake Khovsgol 8,381 low
Khorgo-Tekhyn Tsagaan Arkhangai 773 low
Gobi Gurvansaikhan Omnogovi 26,947 medium
Gorkhi Terelj Tov 2,932 low*
Altai Tavan Bogd Bayan-Olgii 6,362 medium
Khangai Nuruu Arkhangai/Ovorkhangai/Bayank
hongor
8,885 high
Khar Us Nuur Khovd 8,503 low
Noyon Khangai Arkhangai 591 medium
Hustain Nuruu Tov 506 low
Khan Khokhi Khyargas Uvs 5,534 low
SylkhemynMountain Bayan Olgy 1,401 medium
Tsambagarav Mountain Khovd/Bayan-Olgy 1,110 low
Tarvagatain Mountain Arkhangai/Zavkhan 5,254 low
National
conservation
park
Onon-Balj Khentii/Dornod 4,158 medium
* stress from recreational activities high
Nagalkhaan Mountain Tov 31 Medium
Batkhaan Ondorkhaan/Tov 2,185 Low
Lkhachinvandad Sukhbataar 588 Low
Bulgan River Khovd 77 Low
Ugtam Dornod 462 Medium
Sharga Mankhan Khovd/Gobi-Altai 3,901 Medium
Zagyn Us Dundgobi/Dornogobi/South
Gobi
2,736 High
Alag Khairkhan Gobi Altai 364 Low
Burkhan Buudai Gobi Altai 521 Medium
Ergelyn Zoo Dornogobi 609 Low
Ikh Nart Dornogobi 437 Medium
Kgogno Khaan Bulgan 470 Low
Toson Khulstai Khentii/Dornod 4,699 Low
Khar Yamaat Khentii/Sukhbaatar 506 low
Yakhi Lake Dornod 2,514 medium
Nature
reserve
Develyn Aral Bayan Olgii 103 low
Type Name Aimag(s) Size (km2)
Potential
stress from
mining
activities
Table 1. Protected Areas and Potential Stress through Mining
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering and Wasser GMBH.  Cologne 2003.
needs of large mining enterprises—notably Nalaikh, 
Shariin Gol, and Baganuur for coal; Bor Undor for 
fluorspar, and Erdenet for copper/molybdenum. 
These cities were set up as new urban centers with no 
appreciable local rural recruitment. Today this trend 
has become severe, with virtually no rural employment 
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broadly based economy, however, it remains vulnerable 
to the rollercoaster of commodity prices and sharp 
economic decline, with the ultimate closure of the 
mine as the former main employer and sole engine 
of economic prosperity. As yet, only Nalaikh (coal), 
Mardai (uranium), and Bugant (gold) are severely 
depressed towns due to closure of large mines in 
Mongolia. 
Meanwhile, the current institutional and legal frame-
work does not particularly safeguard communities 
living near mining development areas. Development 
programs are undertaken as “add-on” measures by the 
mining company, with the view to establishing a posi-
tive relationship with the local communities. By any 
standard, socioeconomic expenditure by the mining 
companies remains minimal. As a result, important 
social issues remain largely unresolved, including the 
complex issues of land use, financial contributions to 
the local community, and the role of informal mining.
Artisanal and Small-scale Mining
Three very different triggers have fuelled the upsurge 
in ASM (Grayson and Murray, 2003). The initial 
trigger was the transition from a command economy 
to a market economy, which resulted in a large 
pool of unemployed technical, semi-skilled, and 
unskilled workers in the cities and farming villages 
of north-central Mongolia. Lacking marketable skills 
or job opportunities, during the 1997–99 period an 
estimated 20,000 turned to informal mining as a 
cash-earning survival strategy, generally in hard-rock 
and placer gold. A special case arose at Nalaikh, where 
in soums in which 200 placer gold mines are operated 
by 128 companies. Instead, these companies strongly 
prefer to recruit in the capital city and sometimes in 
Darkhan and Erdenet, or even in China and Russia 
if the companies are Chinese or Russian-owned, but 
almost never recruit in rural soums. When asked, 
company managers claim it makes management much 
easier, as it stifles emergence of local networks around 
the mines, and ensures simpler discipline and better 
work ethics. Rural people see the placer mines as being 
destructive of nature, grazing, and winter shelters and 
contributing little to the local economy. 
Nearly all of the placer companies have their 
headquarters in Ulaanbaatar, plus a few in other cities. 
While the soums get scant revenue, merely land use 
tax and water use fees, Ulaanbaatar gains the gold 
(Mongol Bank), royalties (government), jobs, stronger 
banks (seasonal loans), mine engineering support, and 
so forth. Eco-Minex estimates that for tax efficiency 
the 128 placer mining companies have over 1,000 
wholly owned subsidiary companies in Ulaanbaatar 
spanning all sectors. For instance, Erel Ltd left 
dereliction behind in Zaamar but in Ulaanbaatar 
created a business empire, including education, 
banking, insurance, construction, engineering, and 
brick production.
Contrary to initial expectations, placer mining 
companies do little to support the rural economy 
and instead encourage a drift to the cities of people 
and wealth. The same negative phenomenon is now 
being seen with small hard-rock gold mines and most 
brickworks, and some of the new coal mines. Even 
when rural monocities are created to 
meet the needs of the development and 
operation of large mines, there are special 
economic risks. The mines may support 
nearby towns and render them largely 
dependent on the economic performance 
of the mines. Secondary service and 
supply industries have formed towns like 
Baganuur and Bor Undur, which generate 
jobs that also depend to a large extent on 
the mines. The community may gain in 
the development of new professional and 
technical skills brought along by mining, 
and an improved infrastructure may 
facilitate the generation of new industries. 
Unless the town can diversify into a 
Figure 12.  Intensive Small-scale Underground Coal Mining at  
Nalaikh
Source: Rheinbraun Engineering und Wasser GMBH. 2003. “Review of the Environmental and 
Social Policies and Practices for Mining in Mongolia.” Rheinbraun Engineering Background 
Papers. Cologne.
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the closure of the large state-owned coal 
mine and the consequent collapse of as-
sociated industries led to 1,100 local people 
becoming informal coal miners. Resorting 
to informal mining was, and remains, 
a strong social safety net in response to 
closure or downsizing of large manufactur-
ing, mining, and farming enterprises.
The next trigger was the widespread winter 
natural disaster (dzud) of 2001–02, which 
caused catastrophic loss of livestock to 
most of the traditional pastoral livestock 
herder households that dominate the 
steppe and Gobi zones. Tens of thousands 
of households lost their only sources of 
food and income. Some migrated into the 
urban centers, but most remained in the 
rural areas and resorted to informal placer 
gold mining, which generated a daily cash 
income. 
The latest trigger is fundamentally differ-
ent from the first two, although still poverty-driven. 
Mongolia is rapidly increasing its production of 
fluorspar concentrate for export, both chemical grade 
and metallurgical grade. This has been triggered by 
increased world demand stemming from the capping 
of fluorspar exports from China, the world’s biggest 
producer, through imposition of export quotas by the 
Chinese government, followed in May 2005 by the 
final elimination of export rebates. Over the last three 
years, the number of companies in Mongolia mining 
fluorspar has increased tenfold to about 40, mostly 
SMEs. However, most of the new mining is labor-
intensive, since the ore bodies are numerous but thin 
and irregular and unsuited to industrial-scale extrac-
tion. The SMEs have contractual relationships with 
large numbers of small-scale miners, loosely organized 
as artels. Small-scale miners are again vital in the 
processing stage, as visual sorting is the only practical 
means of upgrading the ore, and visual inspection and 
hammering is the most efficient procedure for produc-
ing the “lump” metallurgical concentrate. 
Placer Gold ASM
Most small-scale miners are engaged in placer gold 
mining. Their use of a green plastic bowl for pan-
ning—carried strapped to their back—triggering the 
A large group of ninjas, mostly women and teenagers,  using green plastic kitchen bowls for 
“bowling” pay-gravel in a pool of spring meltwater. The pay gravel is defrosted “permafrost.”  
The pay gravel is carried here in old flour sacks and several handfuls are put in a bowl for 
bowling. All are wearing warm clothing and rubber kitchen gloves. (Image: William Murray of 
Murray Harrison Ltd.)
nickname “ninja” by analogy with the ninja turtles 
television series. Today the term ninja is widely applied 
to all categories of ASM in Mongolia (Grayson and 
Murray, 2003). In the north, placer small-scale miners 
are a complex mix of ex-herders, ex-farm workers, 
urban poor, elderly, and students, albeit in separate 
informal groups. But to the south in the Gobi and 
steppe zones, the situation in simpler: a clear majority 
of placer gold miners are herder households who lost 
their livestock in a natural disaster (dzud). Overall, 
tens of thousands of small-scale miners are engaged 
in placer gold mining and represent a major source 
of conflict with placer mining companies. For a 
period, this enabled effective resource partitioning 
with minimum conflict between the two parties, and 
the presence of informal miners was tolerated if their 
activities were confined to the waste tailings. Rather 
quickly, this tacit understanding broke down, triggered 
by a number of factors. Some inefficient companies, 
such as Mongol Gazar Ltd, reclassified their waste 
tailings as valuable future reserves. 
The placer gold is sold generally the same day to 
ger shops or to roving dealers. The bulk is exported 
illegally to China, and some to South Korea. As a 
consequence, revenue is escaping the government 
and future costs for social, health, and environmental 
mitigation is accumulating. To stem the smuggling 
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and channel the ASM gold into the formal sector, in 
2002 the Mongol Bank (the central bank) commenced 
purchasing gold at the world price from ASM directly 
and from gold buyers as private individuals; in 2005, 
the amount is expected to reach or exceed one ton of 
gold.
Some ASM groups specialize in rewashing the fresh 
tailings of other ASM groups. If the placer is under 
only one or two meters of overburden, then elaborate 
and ingenious arched vaulting may be excavated to 
remove the placer while removing the minimum of 
overburden. Wet processing generally progresses from 
ninja bowls and rubber mats to hand-bailed hoppers 
with static screen bases feeding simple sluices lined 
with ribbed rubber matting or sometimes tufted car-
pet. Further economy of scale is gained by abandoning 
hand-baling in favor of manually operated homemade 
water cannons fed by water from petrol-driven water 
pumps via a flexible hose. Wet processing was once the 
only option, but is now being rapidly replaced in arid 
and semi-arid regions by drywashers, thereby liberat-
ing placer gold ASM to spread far from surface waters, 
often to virgin placers in semi-pristine areas, including 
many protected areas. Until recently, only gravitational 
separation was used, but now mercury has started to 
be added by an as-yet limited number of placer gold 
small-scale miners.
Although almost entirely illegal, informal placer gold 
mining has proved to be a major and effective stimulus 
to rural livelihoods and rural economies, with a strong 
emphasis on poverty alleviation. Informal mining 
gives seasonal or regular employment and additional 
cash income for rural people, reduces migration to 
urban centers, and dampens the effects of catastrophic 
climatic events. 
Contrary to expectation, rather than children being 
school drop-outs the informal miners have the cash 
and commitment to ensure all their children attend 
school, helping with the mining throughout the 
school vacations and every weekend. Although a few 
informal miners have resumed full-time herding, 
the great majority has persisted with informal gold 
mining, and some are gaining skills in mining and 
will stay in this new industry indefinitely. Given the 
persistent threats to the herder lifestyle—overgrazing, 
desertification, fire, and dzuds— and desire for a 
better life, the hard life of being an artisanal miner is 
more attractive in generating a cash income every day, 
and has no perceived risk of sudden loss of livelihood. 
For the foreseeable future, there is no indication of any 
exhaustion of gold obtainable by informal means.
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3. The Regulatory and Institutional 
    Framework
The Regulatory Framework
The 1992 Mongolian Constitution refers to the nation’s mineral wealth. It states that natural resources are subject to national sovereignty and state protection, 
and contains a number of more specific provisions 
related to mining and environment. The state owns all 
land, except that in citizen’s private ownership, as well 
as the subsoil with its mineral wealth, forests, water 
resources, and game (Article 6). Landowners are held 
responsible for the way the land is used, and the land 
can be confiscated by the state if it is used in a manner 
adverse to the interests of environmental protection.
The present Mongolian Law on Mineral Resources 
came into force on July 1, 1997 (Husband et al, 2004). 
The purpose of the law is the regulation of exploration, 
mining, and related activities within the territory of 
Mongolia. It also addresses the promotional role of 
governmental, nongovernmental, and international 
entities in raising environmental awareness through 
environmental education, technical training programs, 
capacity building efforts, and specialized seminars. 
The law confers equal rights to investors, regardless 
of their nationality. License holders have the exclusive 
right to explore and mine all minerals. The govern-
ment may participate in exploration and mining only 
through business entities that are subject to the same 
obligations as any other person under the law. The law 
requires exploration license holders to comply with 
environmental laws and with its environmental protec-
tion provisions. In Articles 29 and 30, it stipulates that 
exploration and mining activities may not commence 
without written approvals; formulates the permitting 
procedure for exploration and mining projects; and 
illustrates the process for exploration and mining 
projects. According to the Law of Mongolia on Land, 
the decision to grant land for use or possession is made 
at the local level, by the soum governors. 
The permitting procedures under the Mongolian Law 
of Environmental Impact Assessment require that 
exploration license holders prepare environmental 
protection plans, which provide for measures to 
ensure that pollution of the environment does not 
exceed prescribed maximum limits, and also an 
environmental impact assessment (Articles 29 and 30). 
The environmental impact assessment needs to include 
environmental baseline data and indices, an appropri-
ate project alternative, recommendations for mitigating 
measures that minimize or eliminate potential adverse 
impacts, a risk assessment, and an environmental 
monitoring program. The draft assessment is sent to 
the proponent for comments. The final report is not 
available to the general public for review, although it 
is a public document. During operations, all instances 
of adverse environmental impacts resulting from 
exploration or mining activities are to be recorded in 
annual reports, and amendments to the environmental 
protection plan are to be proposed accordingly. Public 
hearings are not compulsory, and license holders may 
request the local administrative body to organize a 
public debate (Article 33). Both exploration and min-
ing license holders are obliged to deposit an amount 
equal to 50 percent of their environmental protection 
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budget in a special bank account established by the 
governor of the relevant soum or district (Articles 29 
and 30 respectively). The deposits are to be refunded 
upon implementation of the environmental protection 
plan. 
The rights and obligations of a license holder expire 
upon the termination of the license, except for their 
obligations regarding environmental restoration and 
mine closure (Article 44); in addition, the post-mining 
rehabilitation measures need to be described in a 
separate environmental protection plan. Yet, the 
Minerals Law does not require the license holder to 
rehabilitate the area affected by mining to an extent 
that eliminates dangers completely. Where licenses are 
to be extended, exploration-holders have to submit to 
the governor of the soum or the district a revised or 
new environmental protection plan prior to expiration 
of the existing license term (Article 31). Similarly, the 
holders of mining licenses who apply for an extension 
are required to submit both a new environmental 
impact assessment and a new environmental protection 
plan. Finally, license holders who apply for surrender-
ing part of a licensed area or the entire license area are 
required to attach a certificate from the governor of 
the soum or district to the application stating that they 
have complied with the environmental protection plan 
for the surrendered area (Articles 45 and 46). 
The Minerals Law does not refer specifically to 
artisanal mining and/or to arbitration procedures in 
case of rejection of a proposal by the regulatory agen-
cies. Land access and land disputes are to be resolved 
in accordance with the provisions of the land law, the 
civil law, and other relevant laws (Article 49). How-
ever, this law calls for full compensation of damages 
caused by exploration or mining activities to owners 
of private and public residential dwellings, wells, and 
winter huts, as well as historic and cultural landmarks 
(Article 32). License holders are also required to cover 
relocation costs, and consult and coordinate their 
activities with local administrative bodies in connec-
tion with infrastructure development and employment 
development (Article 33). The Mining Office, as one 
of the agencies responsible for the implementation of 
mineral-related legislation, carries out the research, 
evaluation, and formulation of recommendations with 
respect to the mining industry’s impact on the social 
and economic development of Mongolia (Article 57). 
The Law on Environmental Protection guarantees 
the right to live in a healthy and safe environment, 
ensure that social and economic development is 
ecologically balanced, and that natural resources are 
properly used. The polluter-pays-principle is expressed 
in Article 4; it awards citizens the right to present a 
claim against violators for compensation of damages 
to their property and health resulting from adverse 
impacts on the environment caused by the violator. 
Article 34 provides for fees and payments for environ-
mental pollution and adverse environmental impacts. 
Specifically, fees and payments are required for 
discharging permissible levels of wastes and pollutants. 
Compensation is required for the discharge of wastes 
and pollutants in amounts exceeding permitted limits, 
and for damage caused to the environment. 
The new Law on Land regulates the ownership, use, 
and protection of state-owned land (Tumenbayar, 
2002). Of significance to mining is the establishment 
of “special needs” lands; that is, land under special 
government protection, reserve rangelands, and hay 
land for government fodder reserves—by aimags, the 
Capital City, soums or duuregs, where mining is not 
allowed. In many instances, exploration licenses, min-
ing licenses, and active mines are within special needs 
lands. Typically, these mineral properties were granted 
before the designation of he special needs area, but 
this is by no means uniformly so. In many soums, the 
local administration strongly resists any new mineral 
licenses being granted in the special needs areas. Other 
administrations are more flexible and allow mineral 
licenses provided there are either special conditions 
negotiated or social offsets for the local community.
The new Law on Land also requires that land that has 
been damaged from digging for mining purposes is 
to be restored (Article 52.1.2). Accordingly, annual 
land protection and rehabilitation plans need to be 
developed and assessed by the citizens’ representatives 
of the soums and bags, who may take measures to stop 
the development and/or enforce compliance (Article 
57). Penalties are to be imposed on officials infringing 
on decisions of environmental inspectors to suspend 
or fully terminate activities of plants and companies, 
depending on the nature and extent of the violation 
and the volume of damage (Article 66). 
The existing regulatory framework is, however, weak 
in the areas of public participation, sanctions, and 
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funds for rehabilitation, informal mining, protected 
areas, and compensation for land use (International 
Institute for Environment and Development and 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
2002). 
Public input into the permitting procedure is not 
formalized and is primarily up to the discretion of 
the proponent. A procedure for the solicitation of 
questions, input, and assessment of individuals, as well 
as an arbitration process in the case of contradictory 
appraisals, is missing. The transparency of the permit-
ting processes could also be improved by introducing 
obligatory public involvement in the scoping and 
discussion of EIAs. All EIAs should be published, 
together with the associated Environmental Protection 
Plan (EPP) and Environmental Monitor-
ing Plan (EMP), to enable the public to 
voice any concerns, to render transparent 
the low quality of some, and as a teach-
ing and research resources to drive up 
standards. Once mining has commenced, 
the secrecy shrouding EIAs, EPPs, and 
EMPs is a deterrent to public participa-
tion and the source of much complacency 
and deliberate breaches of regulations in 
the absence of vigilant locals and NGOs 
empowered by access to such documents.
Mongolia should consider becoming a 
signatory to the Aarhus Convention in 
order to formalize public participation in 
environmental decision-making, ensure 
freedom of public access to environ-
mental information, and access to legal 
redress if public access is unreasonably 
barred. This would bring Mongolia into 
line with the majority of states in Eurasia 
and North America, which attain the 
Aarhus objectives regardless of whether 
they are a signatory of not. In addition, 
Mongolia should also consider becoming 
a signatory to the Espoo Convention in 
order to grant equality of public partici-
pation in environmental decision making 
for projects with cross-border impacts, 
equality being bestowed to the public 
in both states. This matter has become 
relevant with the substantial increase in 
proposed mining and mining-related 
infrastructure in the Gobi regions on both 
sides of the Mongolia-China border. For 
example, a new 400-km railroad is to open shortly in 
China terminating at the Mongolian border imme-
diately south of the new Nariin Sukhait coal mine in 
Omnogovi Aimag, but there has been no public debate 
on the Mongolian side regarding the justification for 
this railroad or its route selection.
Sanctions are foreseen in case of violations of the law 
that range from fines up to 250,000 MNT ($220) to 
suspension of the operation or even its termination, 
but enforcement of the environmental provisions 
has been problematic. The Professional Inspectorate 
refused to circulate a list of fines imposed on mines, on 
the questionable grounds that publicity would damage 
the reputation of respected companies.
Box 1. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was announced by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, in September 2002. Its aim is to increase transparency over 
payments by companies to governments and to government-linked entities, as 
well as transparency over revenues by those host country governments. Revenues 
from oil, gas and mining companies, in the form of taxes, royalties, signature bo-
nuses and other payments should be an important engine for economic growth 
and social development in developing and transition countries. However, the lack 
of accountability and transparency in these revenues can exacerbate poor gover-
nance and lead to corruption, conflict and poverty. EITI has issued a set of report-
ing guidelines and a Statement of Principles, available on its official website. EITI 
received official endorsement from the World Bank Group, announced December 
9, 2003.
Nearly 20 countries have committed to EITI principles and criteria since the Lan-
caster House Conference in 2003. Some countries are only beginning to launch 
the process, while others have published revenue and payments data. The Gov-
ernments’s of Azerbaijan, Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Nigeria, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Timor Leste  and Trinidad & Tobago  have made an unequivocal 
public statement outlining how they intended to implement EITI, and are now at 
different stages of implementation. Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Maurita-
nia, Niger, Peru, and Sierra Leone have endorsed EITI and are presently considering 
how they will implement the initiative.
On 2 December 2005 the Government of Mongolia committed to EITI when it held 
a conference on EITI in Ulaanbaatar. Almost a hundred attendees from Govern-
ment, Parliament, local and international companies, local civil society groups, 
international financial institutions, foreign governments, and the media attended 
the conference. Prime Minister Elbegdorj attended and stated that the Mongolian 
Government was keen to move quickly to implement EITI. Prime Minister Elbegdorj 
subsequently wrote to the World Bank and to the EITI Secretariat on 20 Decem-
ber to confirm the Government of Mongolia’s commitment to the Initiative. On 4 
January 2006 a government order was issued establishing a National EITI Council 
charged with implementing EITI.
Source: Authors.
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The legal provision for depositing 50 percent of the 
funds required for rehabilitation on an annual basis 
has not resulted in the expected higher level and 
quality of environmental protection. This is mostly due 
to lack of institutional capacity to ensure the imple-
mentation of rehabilitation measures, and also the 
lack of willingness and capacity of mining operators to 
come up with the remaining 50 percent of the funding 
necessary to complete the environmental protection 
work once mining has ceased. There is a need to 
ensure sufficient funding through bonds or similar 
guarantees. This would force the mining operators to 
internalize the total reclamation cost. Combined with 
an annual review of reclamation performed and future 
reclamation activities expected, financial guarantees 
to cover the total reclamation costs could be fitted to 
the actual progress in the field and to technological 
innovation. 
In most instances, informal mining for gold and coal 
is in violation of environmental and mineral regula-
tion, mostly because of the large number of illegal 
miners, which makes the enforcement of existing 
regulations difficult. A law on artisanal mining was 
drafted several years ago, but in late August 2005 the 
draft was officially abandoned by the government. A 
completely new draft is being prepared for submission 
by the government to Parliament during the fall 2005 
or Spring 2006 session. It is expected that key elements 
of the new ASM Law will include the opening of 
communication channels by the formation of miners’ 
associations, the generation of a cadastre system at the 
soum level, restriction of informal mining to specific 
areas, and the limitation of the size of artisanal mining 
concessions. 
In 2001, the Ministry of Trade and Industry approved 
Regulation No.33 regarding artisanal miners, and 
in 2002 approved Regulation No.53 (Husband et al, 
2004). These granted power to soum governments to 
conclude agreements with mining license holders al-
lowing individual miners to rework tailings and waste 
rock. The license holder may buy the miners’ product 
at a relatively low price, and would in turn ensure safe 
working conditions. Only about 10 mining companies 
accepted the scheme. A problem arose from the sheer 
number of small-scale miners, which put considerable 
strain on the slender human resources of the soum 
administrations regardless of the income generated in 
permit fees. Miners without permits worked alongside 
the permitted miners, leading permitted miners to 
question the point of obtaining permits. It proved 
virtually impossible to administer the permitted 
miners, who often still relocated themselves much 
as they pleased. Few of the thousands of small-scale 
miners that stay only for part of the short summer 
season bothered to request permits. Later, the regula-
tions expired and the small-scale activities reverted 
to being illegal. Nevertheless, the regulations proved 
to be helpful in some conflict-prone goldfields such 
as Zaamar, and valuable experience was gained by 
the central government, local governments, mining 
companies, and small-scale miners.
Although no further regulations were enacted, ad hoc 
arrangements emerged in many areas, notably in the 
Gobi and steppe zones whereby soum administrations, 
generally with support of their aimag administration, 
sought to gather a small monthly local tax from each 
informal miner, often with success. These ad hoc local 
taxes are perceived by the soum administrations and 
the informal miners to bestow a degree of legality on 
the mining activity. In reality, the local taxes are not 
fees for mining activity—as that would be a breach 
of the Minerals Law—but are fees for land use. 
Nevertheless, it is by such Byzantine paths that in 
other countries small-scale miners have incrementally 
gained partial or full legal rights for mining as well as 
land use. 
Recognizing the seriousness and complexity of the 
issue, MIT in mid-2005 set up a new ASM Unit in 
the MRPAM with the assistance of the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The SDC 
recently commenced with MRPAM a long-term ASM 
project focused on policy formulation, drafting of 
legislation and regulations, mediation and conflict 
resolution, technology transfer, training and minimiz-
ing of risks to health, and safety and environment. The 
overall objective is to assist in poverty alleviation in 
rural areas. 
The Mongolian Law on Protected Areas prohibits min-
eral exploration and extraction activities in protected 
areas; it also states that MNE should compensate any 
rightful mineral license holders, who are deprived 
of their rights to explore and mine if their area is 
incorporated into a new protected area. In reality, the 
MNE is grossly under-funded and has no special funds 
available to make such compensation. 
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The compensation for land use in mining is not 
regulated. The reason is that mining, with its regulated 
activities like licensing, a land contract, and taxes, is 
considered an element of a modern, sedentary social 
arrangement applied to a pastoralist social setting 
that is unaware of the intangible property, and where 
regulation of the use of natural resources was tradi-
tionally done by common management. The new Law 
on Mongolian Citizens Ownership of Land stipulates 
that every Mongolian citizen has the right to receive 
a certain amount of land free of charge, and grants 
special privileges to those farmers who worked the 
land for many years. This provision may put them in a 
more advantageous position when it comes to the issue 
of privatization of farmland and compensation for any 
land development, including mining. The timing of 
the privatization is yet to be completely determined. 
In addition, since the users of a particular pasture may 
vary with the seasons, more clarity is needed on who 
should be compensated. 
The provision of lease agreements between mining 
companies and suitable local governments could 
legitimize the use of land certificates as already 
practiced by some local governments. In addition, the 
conclusion of individual or collective land agreements 
might improve the management of a complicated 
development issue for Mongolia.
The Institutional Framework
MIT focuses on supporting development of national 
industries; increasing employment through SMEs and 
consumer goods production and protection; determin-
ing, collecting, and evaluating regional surveys of 
minerals and oil; increasing exports by improving 
international competitiveness of products and services 
through regional networks; developing foreign trade 
and promoting foreign investment; and introducing 
advanced administration management, improved 
technology, and structural reforms. An independent 
regulatory agency—the Geological and Mining 
Inspection Agency (GMIA)—and an independent 
implementing agency (now MRPAM) were created in 
1997 when the current Minerals Law was approved. 
An internal MIT Department of Geology, Minerals 
Policy, and Coordination was subsequently formed to 
more directly link these autonomous agencies to MIT’s 
minerals sector development mandate. 
GMIA has now become a division of a new con-
solidated inspection agency, the State Professional 
Supervision Administration. Its 12 officers are now 
linked to aimag mine inspection agencies reporting 
directly to the prime minister’s office. The rationale 
for this consolidation was to establish inspection and 
enforcement independence by separating this regula-
tory function from potentially conflicting ministry 
mandates, and to reduce overlapping site inspections 
through improved coordination. MIT’s MRPAM is 
the key external implementing agency for minerals. It 
is responsible for issuing mineral licenses, compiling 
mineral industry information, archiving geological 
data, and conducting geological surveys and research. 
It has three divisions: the Department of Geological 
and Mining Cadastre (DGMC), the Mining Office, 
and the Office of Geology/Mongolian Geological 
Survey (MGS). DGMC is both a one-stop initial entry 
point for all applicants and the sole processing and 
granting office for exploration and mining licenses. It 
fulfils the basic requirements of an effective mining 
cadastre. It has 12 officers who implement first-
come/first-served procedures. There remain, however, 
some ambiguities and potentially adverse implications 
inherent to the division of labor across these agencies. 
These include the assignment of extensive exploration 
rights to MRPAM; and insistence on production in 
accordance with the estimated production levels and 
deadlines.
The Mining Office, with a small staff of eight profes-
sionals, is responsible for monitoring and conducting 
research on the technological and socioeconomic 
impacts of the mining industry. An important current 
focus is the regulatory administration of the mining 
license agreements resulting from the 1997 Implemen-
tation Law.
The Office of Geology was originally designed to con-
solidate the functions of the former State Geological 
Center and the State Geological Informational Fund. 
This MRPAM division, also known as the Mongolian 
Geological Survey (MGS), comprises four functional 
units: Geological Research Team, Mineral Resources 
Evaluation Team, Geological Information Center 
(GIC), and the Budget Planning Team. The largest 
of these, the GIC, has 34 officers and is responsible 
for archiving all geological information, maps, and 
records concerning geological research in Mongolia. 
The other three units have a total of 12 officers who 
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are responsible for regional geological, geophysical, 
and geo-environmental mapping and research. 
MRPAM/MGS geological survey and tendering 
activities at times overlap with functions assigned to 
the internal Department of Geology, Minerals Policy, 
and Coordination. MIT is assessing this overlap. One 
option under serious consideration is to strengthen 
the regional mapping capability of MRPAM/MGS 
to undertake this research and obviate the need for 
contractors. A major recipient of MIT budgeted 
funding for regional mapping projects has been the 
state-owned Geological Research Center, which 
reports to the State Property Committee. Its research 
mandate is broadly based and increasingly focused on 
capturing more lucrative private sector contracts for its 
professional services. 
MNE is responsible for developing and enforcing 
environmental and natural resources policies. MNE is 
divided into five departments and two agencies. Since 
February 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has been integrated into the State Professional 
Inspection Agency. Aimag and Capital City governors 
are responsible for developing and implementing 
measures for environmental protection, monitoring 
any activities of local business entities (and prohibiting 
those with adverse effects), and coordinating activities 
at the local level. In particular, the Minerals Law 
gives the local administrative body the responsibility 
to “ensure and monitor compliance by (exploration 
and mining) license holders of their obligations with 
respect to environmental protection, health and 
safety regulations” (Article 4). Since February 2003, 
the inspectors report to the aimag inspection office. 
The soum governor has retained the responsibility of 
organizing and implementing legislation and issuing 
permits. 
State chief inspectors are assigned to the aimags as 
well as the Capital City, while state inspectors/rangers 
are appointed at the soum and duureg level. The basic 
duties of state inspectors are monitoring, inspection, 
information collection, supervision, and instruction of 
rangers. They can require the elimination of adverse 
impacts or the suspension of activities with adverse 
impacts on the environment, and impose administra-
tive penalties on environmental legislation violators.
Mongolia’s institutional framework for managing its 
mineral resources continue to be weak in the enforce-
ment of regulations relating to the procedures for local 
governments to issue land user permissions/contracts, 
for governors to approve of environmental notifica-
tions, and for enforcement of sanctions for license 
violations. Coordination between the Ministries of 
Nature and Environment, Finance, and the State 
Professional Supervision Administration, as well as 
between inter-governmental regulatory and informa-
tion management activities and local administrative 
bodies, is inherently poor. Finally, the government still 
needs to ensure an appropriate level of public partici-
pation, public education, and information disclosure, 
particularly at the local level.
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Based on field observations and a review of background materials, this report identifies the following short-term priorities that should be addressed:
 Support and stimulate the introduction of Best 
Available Techniques into placer gold mining, in 
order to address the considerable but largely un-
necessary environmental impacts and damage to 
livelihoods of rural people. For land-based placer 
gold mining, the following goals of BAT are now 
achievable in Mongolia: gold recovery mostly by 
gravitational methods; an average of more than 90 
percent gold recovery achieved; rear-casting of all 
materials (i.e. no dumping to the sides); minimum 
mining footprint; creation of final contours, 
complete with topsoil cover, the same day as the 
material was excavated; no double-handling of 
materials and no “temporary” mounds of waste; 
minimum abstraction of process water from 
surface or underground sources; recycling of 
semi-cleaned effluent as process water; and zero 
discharge of effluent. Implementation would 
require dissemination of global know-how to 
government and industry, and regulations by 
the MNE on BAT for general environmental 
matters; a joint regulation of MNE and Ministry 
of Agriculture on BAT for topsoil reuse, revegeta-
tion, and aftercare; a regulation from the MIT for 
BAT for wash plants, in particular a requirement 
to be fully mobile and capable of achieving at 
least 90 percent gold recovery.
•
4. Priorities for the Short-Term
 Enable full prior informed consultation in the 
development of mining operations, particularly 
allowing access to and discussion of relevant 
environmental information and documents such 
as EIAs and EMPs, community development and 
revenue management plans. The existing legal 
and procedural basis for public participation can 
be strengthened by Mongolia becoming a signa-
tory of the Aarhus Convention and the Espoo 
Convention. 
 Improve employment opportunities for local people 
in mining. At the national level, it is important 
to ensure that more employees are Mongolian 
citizens, especially in long-established mining 
operations. Under existing regulations, all foreign 
citizens have to obtain a permit from the Ministry 
of Employment; permission need not be granted 
if there is no shortage of available Mongolians 
qualified for the post, but there is little sign of this 
power being used in a meaningful manner in the 
mining sector. The alternative approach is to make 
employment of a minimum quota of Mongolian 
citizens a condition of a company holding a 
mining license. Of these, a small number should 
be reserved for residents of the soum and aimag 
in which the mining operation is based, as the 
overriding majority of Mongolians employed in 
mining were recruited in the cities. Implementa-
tion would require amendment to either the 
Minerals Law by Parliament or by amendment to 
an associated regulation by MIT.
 Address the fate of mine-dependent communities. 
Local governments in partnerships with investors 
•
•
•
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should be encouraged to diversify into alternate 
industries in order to prevent social upheaval 
in the event of mine closure. Depending on the 
location, some areas may be suitable for activities 
such as tourism, mineral water production, other 
mining activities, farming, or the production of 
solar energy. Where no alternatives can be found, 
government could become involved jointly with 
the mining company to forecast and mitigate the 
socioeconomic effects of eventual mine closure.
 Adopt a law on artisanal mining which includes 
the establishments of miners’ associations, the 
generation of a cadastre system at the soum level, 
restriction of informal mining to specific areas, 
and the limitation of the size of artisanal mining 
concessions. 
•
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